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In Crimes Against Humanity, Kerstin von Lingen proposes a twofold argument about
the history of the eponymous concept. First, von Lingen emphasizes the longue-
durée history of crimes against humanity as a moral and political concept. Since
the mid-nineteenth century, it circulated in various “arenas of juridification” like the
St. Petersburg Conference (1868), the Brussels Conference (1874), and especially
the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences. The First World War brought with
it a series of blunted firsts. In a 1915 telegram for example, the governments of
France, Great Britain and Russia condemned the Ottoman Empire for crimes against
humanity, marking the first-ever use of the concept in a diplomatic document. But
the telegram barely resonated and spurred no legal action. Throughout her book,
von Lingen highlights the role of civil society in the concept’s history and its deeper
embedment within the history of the laws of war, thereby decentering the singular
influence of the military victors and their lawyers in 1945.
Von Lingen insists on the importance of the Martens Clause to the history of crimes
against humanity, an entanglement that gestures towards larger questions of the
entwined temporalities of history and law, and their political implications. Devised in
1899, the Martens Clause placed populations and combatants under the protection
of “the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established
between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience […] until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued.”
The metronome of legal reform
Second, in the 1940s, “semi-peripheral” international lawyers and diplomats in
exile from the occupied states of Europe worked towards the juridification of crimes
against humanity through a series of organizations in and around London. The
work of these organizations—the Cambridge Commission, the London International
Assembly (LIA), and especially the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(UNWCC)—created the conceptual preconditions for the prosecution of German and
Japanese leaders for crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.
The UNWCC was, to use von Lingen’s metaphor, the “metronome” [Taktgeber, 297]
of international legal reform in the 1940s. British and U.S. officials often deferred to
or even defended state sovereignty – in a particularly striking citation, von Lingen
quotes British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden as coldly saying that nothing was to
be done about Buchenwald, as “crimes committed by Germans against Germans,
however reprehensible, are in a different category from war crimes and cannot be
dealt with under the same procedure” (306).
Meanwhile, the UNWCC – the Czech jurist and politician Bohuslav E#er in particular
– kept setting impulses. It was the UNWCC that reanimated crimes against humanity
from its interwar hiatus, using it in a 1944 meeting to describe the legal responsibility
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of the Nazi leadership for crimes committed in German territories against German
citizens. Here, the concept was for the first time defined in a way that made it useful
as a tool for criminal prosecution, a breakthrough that would continue in fits and
starts at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, and culminate in the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994).
The triad of the Martens Clause
If the UNWCC was the metronome of legal reform, the Martens Clause supplied the
“triad” [Dreiklang, 337] that animated its melody: civilization, the laws of humanity,
and public conscience. The centrality of the Martens Clause to von Lingen’s
history of crimes against humanity raises puzzling questions about the conflicting
temporalities of law and history, how law uses history, and vice versa.
The Martens Clause’s future-oriented capaciousness of progressive completeness
and the universal valence of “humanity” meant that again and again, jurists returned
to the Martens Clause to legitimize new law by grounding it on old principles. In
1942, German-Jewish jurist-in-exile Georg Schwarzenberger based his appeal for
the international recognition of all actions running counter to international law as
crimes on the Martens Clause (293). In 1944, E#er emphasized that the Martens
Clause and its central concept of humanity were still at the very heart of international
law. These are examples of lawyers using past law, drawing on the prestige of well-
known declarations to propose reform. There is a fascinating tension, here, between
the centrality of sovereignty in the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and the use of the
Martens Clause by lawyers in the 1940s to articulate legal principles that reached
beyond sovereignty.
Von Lingen not only records the historical uses of the Martens Clause, she also
interprets the historical record through its triad. When Marcel de Baer reached
out to Lord Maugham in 1942 to advocate for an international criminal court in the
House of Lords, he engaged the public “in line with the third element of the Martens
Clause” – public conscience – von Lingen maintains (257). When Lord Wright and
the UNWCC advocated that crimes against humanity should be a universal concept
applicable to the Holocaust and to other future mass atrocities as well, this was
“clearly reminiscent of the universalist aspirations of the Martens Clause” (316). And
when UNWCC Chair Sir Cecil Hurst advocated for the work of his organization to be
given broader scope in 1944, he legitimized this step with reference to the “public
mind,” which amounted to “an explicit reference to ‘public conscience,’ an element
known from the Martens Clause” (296).
The Martens Clause and historical narrative
These are examples of Kerstin von Lingen, a professor of contemporary history at
the University of Vienna, taking up law to structure historical narrative and bring
order into a messy conceptual universe. In Crimes Against Humanity, civilization,
the laws of humanity, and public conscience seem neatly anchored in the Martens
Clause. But it is a deceptive tidiness. After all, the concepts of the “triad” were
used in a great number of other nineteenth-century legal documents and circulated
widely beyond them as well. They were basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) in their own
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right, unwieldy and capacious. By affixing the intellectual history of crimes against
humanity to the Martens Clause, von Lingen foregoes a more thorough treatment of
the multilayered conceptual histories of civilization, humanity, and public conscience.
Most provocatively, when documents are silent on the Martens Clause and its
constituent concepts, von Lingen nevertheless reads them into history. She admits,
for example, that the final report of the LIA did not mention the term humanity, but
still insists that “the universalist aspirations of the Martens Clause are tangible,” in
concepts like the “laws of mankind” perhaps, or the appeal to “certain standards”
below which public morality ought not fall (255). I, too, see the final report’s
universalist aspirations, but am troubled by the interpretive connection of the LIA
report to the Martens Clause. What are the stakes of such a connection, and to
what extent does it overstate the importance of the Martens Clause to the history of
crimes of humanity?
It is one thing to describe how jurists turned to a foundational document to
legitimize attempts at international legal reform. But to structure history according
to the progressive logic of this foundational document is to replicate the lawyers’
legitimizing impulse, only here not to bolster reform but rather to celebrate the
Martens Clause itself. In an article in 2000, Italian jurist Antonio Cassese called
the Martens Clause a “legal myth.” This myth remains intact in Crimes Against
Humanity.
Pluralities of the legal
Equally perplexing is the concept of the legal in Crimes Against Humanity. Even in
its primarily moral and political incarnations, crimes against humanity was bound up
with juridification debates, and yet von Lingen insists that it only became a legal tool
in the 1940s. I want to propose a more pluralistic concept of law and the legal, one
that makes room for diachronic change and synchronic multilayeredness. Similarly,
I wished for more of an explanation of what, to von Lingen, makes a concept either
moral or political, and what the stakes of such a binary distinction are compared to
thinking through the moral politics (Moralpolitik) of crimes against humanity.
Lastly, I grapple with the consequences of a narrowly defined concept of the legal
for the overall narrative of Crimes Against Humanity. If crimes against humanity
only became a legal concept during the Second World War, its earlier history,
notwithstanding all insistence on the importance of the nineteenth century, becomes
a kind of pre-history. The movement from the nineteenth century to Nuremberg,
then, becomes an act of modernization (Modernisierung, e.g. 138, 168) and,
cautiously, even progress (Fortschritt, e.g. 168). This modernization narrative
leaves little room for the ambivalences of the ever-increasing legal codification
and institutionalization of the last 160 years. It takes up the impulse of the Martens
Clause toward a “more complete code” without reflecting on its particular historicity
– after all, the Martens Clause was added to the Hague Rules of Land Warfare over
irreconcilable disagreements about the status of francs-tireurs under international
law.
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Despite these questions, Crimes Against Humanity provides an important revisionist
history of crimes against humanity in the eighty-odd years after the founding of the
Red Cross. The monograph particularly shines in its detailed treatment of the work
of jurists-in-exile in London during the Second World War, and its discussion of the
foundational period of modern international law since the mid-nineteenth century.
- 4 -
